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Religious fundamentalism is associated with Christian–Islamic conflicts globally, but the psy-
chological reasons remain unexplored. Here, we show that fundamentalism is detrimental to
interreligious relations because it makes Christians and Muslims alike reject common theological
grounds and Abrahamic origins. Specifically, Study 1 demonstrated that such dual Abrahamic
categories mediated the negative effects of fundamentalism on real monetary donations to outgroup
children desperately in need (i.e., Save the Children Syria) among Christians but not Atheists. Of
importance, this was the case only to the degree that Syrian children were perceived as Muslims and,
hence, as part of an Abrahamic outgroup. Using a double-randomized experimental design, Study
2 demonstrated the causal effects of religious fundamentalism on Abrahamic categorization and
of Abrahamic categorization on mutual resource distribution bias among Muslims and Christians.
Together, these studies suggest that religious fundamentalism fuels interreligious conflicts because
it crucially impacts basic categorization processes, with subsequent negative effects on intergroup
relations.
Religious fundamentalism regularly surfaces in public discourse on conflicts of both inter- and
intranational scale, such as wars on terror, conflicts in the Middle East, or tense intergroup
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relations in multicultural societies. Although religious fundamentalism is often portrayed as
confined to Muslims and the Islamic world, it can be found in virtually any religion (Altemeyer
& Hunsberger, 1992). Irrespective of their specific religious denomination, fundamentalists dif-
fer from their moderate religious peers in holding particularly preclusive religious conceptions,
believing is a single right way to salvation that has to be followed rigidly (Altemeyer, 2003).
Possibly to defend their stolid ideological stance (Brandt & Reyna, 2010), individuals high
on religious fundamentalism tend to hold negative attitudes toward dissentients (Hall, Matz,
& Wood, 2010). Indeed, fundamentalist notions have repeatedly been used to justify extreme
acts of violence toward other groups (Emerson & Hartman, 2006), including the 12th-century
crusades, atrocities as between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, or terroristic mass murder,
most recently as conducted by Christian fundamentalist Anders Behring Breivik.
Here, we propose that religious fundamentalism is particularly derogative for Christian–
Islamic relations because it leads Muslims and Christians to overlook blatant theological
commonalities between their religions, reinforcing the division between “us” and “them” that
has detrimental effects on intergroup relations, as demonstrated by decades of work within the
social identity tradition (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Yet, although often ignored in
public discourse and religious education (Plante, 2009), Islam and Christianity are theologically
related in many ways. Not only do various religious figures, such as Moses, Jesus, Noah, or
Jonah, play important roles in both religions, but Islam and Christianity also both trace their
origins to the progenitor Abraham/Ibrahim. Some contemporary religious leaders do recognize
this common heritage. For instance, King Hussain of Jordan, arguably a descendent of the
Prophet Mohammed, emphasized the importance to “bring together the Children of Abraham”
(King Hussein I, 1991), while Pope John Paul II depicted Abraham as the “common forefather”
in Lisbon in 1982.
Because such dual categories—notions of a shared, superordinate group including the
ingroup and immediate outgroups in addition to one’s own subgroup category—generally atten-
uate intergroup bias (see, e.g., Dovidio, Gaertner, Shnabel, Saguy, & Johnson, 2009; Gaertner
& Dovidio, 2000, 2005), here we test if endorsing a common Abrahamic group attenuates
mutual intergroup bias among Muslims and Christians. Crucially, we predict that religious fun-
damentalism will limit the degree to which believers endorse such a dual Abrahamic religious
category in the first place, precisely because fundamentalism involves a narrow worldview
(Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005) and a tendency to reject alternative religious interpretations
(Brandt & Reyna, 2010). This, we propose, is an underlying, mediating process that makes
religious fundamentalism fuel hostile group relations in many parts of the world.
In a cross-national context, Study 1 tests whether endorsing the common origins of Christian-
ity and Islam mediates the detrimental effects of religious fundamentalism on costly, altruistic
helping of outgroup children in dire need. To do so, we gave American workers on Amazon
Mechanical Turk an unexpected bonus of $1 and the opportunity to donate any or none of this
amount to Save the Children Syria. In terms of limiting factors, we expected dual Abrahamic
categorization to mediate the effect of religious fundamentalism on aid donations (a) only
among Christians because it should be irrelevant for Atheists’ self-concepts and (b) only to the
degree that Syrians are perceived as Muslim, and hence as part of the Abrahamic group.
In a tense intranational context, Study 2 tests the full causal chain of our proposed medi-
tational model among Muslims and Christians in Germany using a double-randomized design
(see MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; Sherman & Gorkin, 1980). Specifically we test (a) if
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manipulating the saliency of religious fundamentalism causes dual Abrahamic categorization
to change and (b) if manipulating dual Abrahamic categorization causes reduced mutual bias in
Tajfel-like resource distribution scenarios, and leads to more positive feelings toward Abrahamic
but not non-Abrahamic outgroups.
STUDY 1
Material and Methods
Participants
As no comparable studies were available to gather information about the expectable effect
size, we conducted power analyses for a small effect .f 2 D :10/ in regression-based analyses.
Results indicated that n D 124 would be needed to have at least an 80% chance to observe
such an effect with a significance criterion of .05. This sample size would also meet the criteria
of 100 to 150 participants suggested by Wang and Wang (2012) and a rule of thumb ratio of
10 to 20 participants per variable (see Tanaka, 1987). Although no information is available
about the religious affiliation of workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk, we, based on census
data, expected most MTurkers to identify as Christians, followed by Atheists and followers
of other faiths. To ensure that we would meet the minimum sample for both Christians and
Atheists, we collected data from all in all 400 participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Of these participants, 179 were Christians, 134 Atheists, and 87 identified with other religious
affiliations. Due to the purpose of our study, only Christian and Atheist participants were
retained for analyses (Mage D 34:36, SDage D 11:82; male D 60.4%).
Procedure and Measures
Respondents were paid 70 cents for participating in a study on “social issues.” They
first answered questions assessing religious fundamentalism as well as strength of religious
identification in randomized order, as subgroup identification has been found to negatively
predict common categorizations (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) so that religious identification is
an important control variable. Next, participants answered a measure assessing dual Abrahamic
categorization and were then given the opportunity to donate a part or none of a surprise $1
bonus to Save the Children Syria before answering demographic questions.1 Unless stated
otherwise, all responses were scored on 7-point Likert scales with 1 (totally disagree) and 7
(totally agree) as endpoints. All analyses were run with SPSS 21 and the PROCESS regression
macros (Hayes, 2013).
Religious fundamentalism. The revised religious fundamentalism scale (Altemeyer &
Hunsberger, 2004) was used to measure fundamentalist beliefs .˛ D :97/. The scale consists
of 12 items, such as “To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one,
fundamentally true religion” or “God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to
happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed.”
1An emotion measure that also was part of the original survey is not presented here due to reasons of brevity and
the behavioral focus of the study.
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Religious identification. We used an adapted version of the collective self-esteem scale
(Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) to measure religious identification .˛ D :94/. Participants indicated
their agreement with four items such as “The religion I belong to is an important reflection of
who I am.”
Dual Abrahamic categorization. We wrote four items to reflect the dual identity con-
ceptualization of Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy (2007). Specifically, participants indicated
their agreement with the statements “Because Abraham is the progenitor of both Islam and
Christianity, one can say that Muslims and Christians belong to the same ’family’ of religions”;
“Christians as well as Muslims believe in an Abrahamic religion”; “Christianity and Islam have
common roots”; and “Even though Islam and Christianity are different religions, both belong
to the same group of religions,” forming a reliable scale .˛ D :93/.
Donation task. Participants read information about the conflict in Syria adapted from the
Save the Children Syria webpage.2 Next, they were told that they had received a payment
bonus of $1 and asked if they would like to donate any given amount between 0 and 100 cents
(using a sliding response scale):
4 million Syrian children are suffering as a result of a horrific conflict—one of the worst human-
itarian crises of our time—which is now stretching into its third year. Two million people have
fled to neighboring countries Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan, but many more remain in dire need of
assistance. Save the Children Syria is on the ground helping to keep children safe, providing the
basics they need, like food and blankets and offering programs to help them cope with tragedy.
We grant you a 1 dollar bonus for your participation in our study. How much of this bonus would
you like to donate to Save the Children Syria?
At the very end of the study, after answering demographic questions, we asked participants
to indicate the percentage of the Syrian population they believed to be Muslim: “How many per-
cent of the Syrian population do you think is Muslim? (Please do not use the internet to find the
right answer, we are only interested in your own, rough estimate.)” This was done to assess the
degree to which participants indeed perceived Syrians as a Muslim, hence Abrahamic, outgroup.
Results
Although participants in total donated $116.69 out of $398 to Save the Children Syria, Chris-
tians on average donated significantly more (M D 34:62 cents, SD D 39:44) than Atheists
(M D 20:73 cents, SD D 30:79), t.310:43/ D  3:49, p D :001, 2 D :04. Also, the
donation variable was positively skewed only among Atheists (skewness D 1.49) but not
among Christians (skewness D 0.69).
We conducted second-stage moderated mediation analyses (Edwards & Lambert, 2007),
with religious fundamentalism as predictor variable, dual Abrahamic categorization as mediator,
donation as dependent variable, and percentage of Syrians perceived to be Muslim as moderator
of the relation between dual Abrahamic categorization and donation (see Figure 1). As the
distinction between Christians and Atheists is central to the hypotheses of the study, the
2http://www.savethechildren.org/site/c.8rKLIXMGIpI4E/b.7998857/k.D075/Syria.htm
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FIGURE 1 Estimated second-stage moderated mediation model in Study 1 is displayed. Religious identifi-
cation is controlled for. *p < :05, ***p < :001.
analyses were run separately for both groups. Religious identification, which was positively
related to religious fundamentalism (r D :80, p < :001), negatively related to dual Abrahamic
categorization (r D  :34, p < :001) and was unrelated to the remaining variables (.574 <
ps < .581), was controlled for as covariate in each stage of the analyses.
The results supported our hypotheses. To start with, religious fundamentalism was related
to less dual Abrahamic categorization in the first regression for both groups, whereas religious
identification remained insignificant as predictor (see Table 1). However, supporting the first
limiting factor, the degree to which participants perceived Syrians as a Muslim outgroup moder-
ated the relationship between dual Abrahamic categorization and donation among Christians but
not among Atheists for whom Abrahamic categorization does not affect the definition of their
group. Specifically, the moderated regression part of the mediational chain and, most impor-
tantly, the interaction term between dual Abrahamic categorization and percentage of Syrians
perceived to be Muslim were significant only among Christians (see Table 2). Put differently,
as expected, dual Abrahamic categorization was unrelated to donation among Atheists.
Also our second limiting factor obtained support. Following up on the significant mod-
eration among Christians, analyses of the conditional effects showed that dual Abrahamic
categorization lead to more donations only among participants who perceived most Syrians to
TABLE 1
Dual Abrahamic Categorization Regressed on Religious Fundamentalism and Religious Identification
Christians
F(2, 176) D 19.27,
p < .001, R2 D .18
Atheists
F(2, 131) D 8.62,
p < .001, R2 D .11
Predictor B SE ˇ p B SE ˇ p
Religious fundamentalism  .42 .10  .51 <.001  .65 .17  .34 <.001
Religious identification .09 .09 .12 .337  .02 .11  .02 .863
Note. Variance inflation factor (Christians: 3.04; Atheists: 1.15) and tolerance statistics (Christians: .33; Atheists:
.87) indicated absence of collinearity between the predictors.
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TABLE 2
Moderated Regression with Donation to Save the Children Syria as Dependent Variable
Christians
F(5, 173) D 3.89,
p < .002, R2 D .10
Atheists
F(5, 128) D 2.03, p D .078
Predictor B SE ˇ p B SE ˇ p
Religious fundamentalism  1.47 3.10  .06 .636  4.24 3.60  .11 .242
Religious identification  .32 2.68  .02 .905  1.86 2.10  .08 .377
DACa .94 2.29 .03 .683 .48 1.75 .03 .785
PSMa .51 .15 .27 .001 .24 .14 .16 .103
DAC  PSM .27 .11 .18 .014 .06 .08 .06 .497
Note. DAC D Dual Abrahamic categorization, PSM D percentage of Syrians perceived to be Muslims.
aMean centered.
be Muslim, scoring one standard deviation above the mean on the percentage variable and,
hence, saw the donation as clearly supporting an Abrahamic outgroup (see Figure 2). No such
effect was observed for scores on the mean or one standard deviation below the mean on
the percentage variable. Consistent with this finding, bias-corrected bootstrapping with 5,000
bootstrap resamples confirmed that religious fundamentalism had an indirect negative effect on
FIGURE 2 Simple slopes for mean donations toward Save the Children Syria regressed on interaction
between dual Abrahamic categorization and perception of Syrians being Muslims in Study 1.
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donation that was mediated by dual Abrahamic categorization only when participants perceived
Syrians as predominantly being Muslim, B D  2:70, SE D 1:59, 95% CI [ 6.36,  .04], but
not when this perception was moderate, B D  :40, SE D 1:06, 95% CI [ 2.64, 1.65], or low,
B D 1:90, SE D 1:34, 95% CI [ .25, 5.16].
Because our moderated mediational model was based on cross-sectional data, it was impor-
tant also to test the most plausible alternative model, namely, a model in which dual Abrahamic
categorization is the predictor and religious fundamentalism the mediating variable. In this
model, dual Abrahamic categorization predicted religious fundamentalism only weakly in the
first regression, ˇ D  :19, SE D :05, p < :001, F.2; 176/ D 207:37, p < :001, R2 D :70,
whereas the control variable religious identification emerged as main predictor, ˇ D :76,
SE D :04, p < :001. Crucially, in the moderated regression part, F.5; 173/ D 2:59, p D :028,
R2 D :07, the interaction term between religious fundamentalism and percentage of Syrians
perceived to be Muslims (ˇ D  :07, SE D :08, p D :696) as well as all remaining predictors
(.118 < ps < .711) were insignificant giving support of our hypothesized model in favor of
this alternative model.
STUDY 2
Material and Methods
Participants
Because parts of the analyses involved multigroup structural equation modeling, we aimed at
recruiting between 100 and 150 participants per group as has been suggested as minimum sam-
ple size (see Wang & Wang, 2012). In total, 288 participants from Germany (141 Christians and
147 Muslims) were recruited through advertisement on online social networks and webpages
relevant to our study on “interreligious issues,” satisfying this sample size criterion in both
groups. The majority of participants consisted of young adults (Mage D 24:27, SDage D 7:41)
and were male (63.9%).
Procedure and Measures
As part of the double-randomized experimental design, participants consecutively went
through a religious fundamentalism manipulation and a categorization manipulation:
Religious fundamentalism manipulation. In the first part of the experiment, we used
an order-manipulation of religious fundamentalism akin to Jost and Kay (2005) to alter the
salience of religious fundamentalism. This type of manipulation can be used to activate mental
constructs, increasing their accessibility (Schwartz, Bless, Wänke, & Winkielman, 2003), with
subsequent effects on causally related constructs. Specifically, participants were assigned to
a religious fundamentalism protrait, contrait, or control group. In the protrait condition,
participants indicated their agreement with five items3 from the scale used in Study 1, for
which higher agreement represents more religious fundamentalism (e.g., “The fundamentals of
3Two items of the religious fundamentalism scale that dealt with theologically variant constructs such as Satan
were excluded.
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God’s religion should never be tampered with, or compromised with others’ beliefs.”) In the
contrait condition, participants indicated their agreement with five reversed items from the same
scale, for which agreement represents less religious fundamentalism (e.g., “All of the religions
in the world have flaws and wrong teachings. There is no perfectly true, right religion.”) In
the control condition, no items were presented. Many competing theories have attempted to
explain how such salience manipulations affect behavior, and uncertainty about the underlying
process remains, where “one of the most critical is the question of how to predict what type of
effect will emerge from any single priming event” (Loersch & Payne, 2011, p. 235). Indeed,
it is not unusual that the same manipulations have different, sometimes opposing, effects (see
Bargh, 2006, for a review). Therefore, this control group was crucial to determine whether
respondents would assimilate to the items presented (e.g., by showing less endorsement of a
dual Abrahamic categorization when primed with protrait fundamentalism items) or contrast
to the items (e.g., by showing more endorsement of a dual Abrahamic categorization when
primed with contrait religious fundamentalism items).
In each condition, participants were then asked to indicate their agreement with the dual
Abrahamic categorization measure .˛ D :86/ from Study 1 and to complete a Tajfel-like
resource allocation task adopted from Sidanius, Haley, Molina, and Pratto (2007).4 This task
tested the degree to which they maximized relative difference between the ingroup and the
outgroup, even at the expense of absolute ingroup gains. That is, was maintaining a relative
bias that benefitted the ingroup over the outgroup so important for participants that they would
even pay for it by accepting lower absolute gains? Specifically, participants had to choose one of
seven alternative ways to distribute an unspecified sum of money between Christian and Islamic
social organizations for the elderly. Here, a value of 1 (i.e., “190 000e for [in-group: either
Christian or Muslim] organizations and 250 000e for [out-group: either Christian or Muslim]
organizations”) represents a preference for absolute ingroup gain, whereas 4 (i.e., “130 000e for
[in-group] and 130 000e for [out-group] organizations”) represents equal distribution between
both groups, and a value of 7 (i.e., “70 000e for [in-group] organizations and 10 000e for
[out-group] organizations”) represents maximum ingroup gain relative to the outgroup. In other
words, the higher individuals scored on this measure, the more they prioritized giving their
group more money relative to the outgroup, even when this meant that their group would
receive less money in absolute terms.
Categorization Manipulation
Next, individualswere once again randomly assigned to one of three categorization conditions,
namely, a separate groups condition, a dual Abrahamic group condition, or a control condition:
 In the separate groups condition, respondents first read a text emphasizing theological
differences, presented on three separate pages, which participants had to click through to
ensure that they actually read and not simply skipped the text:
When one reads both the Bible and the Qur’an, one realizes that Islam and Christianity are two
very different religions. In Christianity, Jesus is not only the sonof God, but God himself. This is
not the case in Islam where Jesus is just one of many prophets. In Islam, the last Prophet is Mo-
4Participants also responded to a stereotypes and emotions measure, which we chose not to elaborate on because
we were primarily interested in behavioral aspects of intergroup bias.
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hammed,who is not evenpart of Christianity. Also in terms of celebrations and traditions, Chris-
tians andMuslims are very different.While Christians celebrate the birth of Jesus,Muslims cele-
brate the feastofsacrificeduring theHaddsch.Concluding,onecansay thatIslamandChristianity
are very different religious groups, becauseMuslims and Christians believe in different things.
After reading the text, participants in this group were asked to categorize themselves
as Christian, Muslim, or Atheist.
 In the dual Abrahamic group condition, individuals first read a text, again divided on
three pages, describing theological commonalities that make both Islam and Christianity
being Abrahamic religions:
Many Christians and Muslims have forgotten the commonalities between their religions. For
instance, both Islam and Christianity refer to the common progenitor Abraham and to the
fact that he only believed in one god. This god, Christians and Muslims still believe in today.
Also the Qur’an and Bible have many commonalities. In both books, Adam is described
as the first human who had to flee from paradise. Moreover, figures such as Jesus, Moses,
Noah, Ismael, Jakob, David and Jonah play important roles in both religions. Due to these
various commonalities, both religions belong to the group of Abrahamic religions.
After reading the text, participants were asked to categorize themselves as Abrahamic-
Christian, Abrahamic-Muslim, or Atheist.
 In the control condition, participants neither read a text nor were asked to categorize
themselves.
Following each experimental condition, respondents completed a second resource allocation
task equal to the one described earlier, with the difference that the target groups this time
constituted Christian/Muslim youth clubs. In addition, they were asked to rate their feelings
towards the Abrahamic outgroup (i.e., Muslims or Christians) and toward a range of non-
Abrahamic groups (i.e., Hindus, Buddhists, Atheists, and Scientologists). Here, to reduce re-
sponse variations due to cultural differences between the study groups, feelings were measured
on a low level of abstraction (see Mesquita & Frijda, 1992) using a feeling thermometer adopted
from Verkuyten (2007). Specifically, participants were asked to rate their feelings towards each
group, with 0 representing very cold or negative feelings and 100 representing very warm
or positive feelings. Of importance, for both the resource distribution task and the feeling
thermometer, the ingroups and outgroups simply were termed Muslims or Christians in the
control and separate group condition, whereas they were explicitly named Abrahamic-Muslims
and Abrahamic-Christians in the dual Abrahamic group condition to underline their fellow
group membership. At the end of the study, participants answered demographical questions
regarding their age, gender, and religious affiliation.
Results
The Causal Effect of Manipulating the Salience of Religious
Fundamentalism on Dual Abrahamic Categorization
Testing the first causal leg of our mediational model, a 3 (religious fundamentalism saliency
condition: Contrait, Protrait, Control)  2 (religious group: Muslims, Christians) analysis of
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variance with dual Abrahamic categorization as dependent variable and age and gender as
covariates indicated a significant main effect of the saliency manipulation, F.2; 280/ D 5:88,
p D :003, 2p D :04; a significant effect of the religious group variable with Muslims showing
generally higher degrees of dual Abrahamic categorization, F.1; 280/ D 25:93, p < :001,
2p D :09; and a significant interaction between the saliency manipulation and religious group,
F.2; 280/ D 4:45, p D :012, 2p D :03.
As predicted, the experimental manipulations of religious fundamentalism caused congruent
changes in dual Abrahamic categorization. An inspection of the error bars in Figure 3 suggested
that, due to a decrease in the salience of religious fundamentalism, participants in the protrait
condition endorsed dual Abrahamic categorization to a greater extent (M D 4:54, SE D :14)
than in the contrait condition (M D 3:90, SE D :14, p D :001) regardless of their religious
denomination. However, for whatever reasons, the baseline religious fundamentalism differed
between the two religious groups as indicated by the agreement with dual Abrahamic catego-
FIGURE 3 Effects of religious fundamentalism (RF) salience manipulation on dual Abrahamic Categoriza-
tion (DAC) in Study 2 among Muslims and Christians.
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FIGURE 4 Estimated multigroup structural equation model among Muslims and Christians in Study 2 is
displayed. Note. Structural weights are constrained. ***p < :001.
rization among participants in the control condition who had not answered to any religious
fundamentalism items. Consequently, we constructed a new experimental dummy variable
with 0 constituting antifundamentalism (i.e., the protrait condition) and 1 constituting pro-
fundamentalism (i.e., the contrait condition) that consistently resulted in lower dual Abrahamic
categorization in both groups.
As no direct effects of the experimental conditions were observed for the first distribution
task, t.185/ D :34, p D :737, multigroup path analyses in AMOS 21 was used to test a model
with the manifest experimental dummy variable as predictor, the manifest dual Abrahamic
categorization variable as mediator and the manifest resource distribution task as dependent
variable. A version of the model with constrained structural weights obtained a very close
fit to the data, 2.4; 187/ D 1:36, p D :851, root mean square error of approximation <
.001, 90% CI [<.001, .061], PCLOSE: p D :928, comparative fit index D 1.00, Tucker-Lewis
index D 1.15. Of importance and further underlining the universality of the relations across
the samples, no significant model-fit differences were observed between the constrained and
an unconstrained version of the model, 2 < 0:00, df D 1, p D :999. Hence, as the
relationships tested in the model were invariant across the religious groups, the constrained
model was estimated. As displayed in Figure 4, across the groups, the religious fundamentalism
saliency condition negatively predicted dual Abrahamic categorization (B D  :63, SE D :19;
Muslims: ˇ D  :22, p < :001; Christians: ˇ D  :26, p < :001), which in turn negatively
related to bias in the first resource distribution task (B D  :44, SE D :10; Muslims: ˇ D  :33,
p < :001; Christians: ˇ D  :33, p < :001). Bootstrapping with 5,000 bootstrap resamples
showed that the resulting indirect effect was significant,B D :52, SE D :03, ˇ D :09, p < :001,
95% CI [.033, .158].
The Effect of Dual Abrahamic Categorization on Resource
Distribution Bias
Inspection of the error bars in Figure 5 showed that the separate group condition increased
group bias in the second resource distribution task compared to the control group, whereas
the dual Abrahamic categorization condition reduced bias, such that the separate and dual
Abrahamic group conditions differed significantly from each other. Consequently, we conducted
a 2 (experimental condition: separate group, dual Abrahamic group)  2 (religious group:
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FIGURE 5 Difference between categorization conditions in Study 2 are displayed. Significance estimates
are based on multivariate analysis of variance results.
Muslims, Christians) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with all bias measures as
dependent variables. We found two main effects across the bias variables:
1. Muslims generally displayed less bias toward the Abrahamic outgroup than did Christians,
F.6; 175/ D 16:35, p < :001, 2p D :35.
2. As predicted, participants who recategorized themselves into a dual Abrahamic group
showed less bias, F.6; 175/ D 2:37, p D :031, 2p D :08.
An insignificant interaction term between religious group and the recategorization manipulation,
F.6; 175/ D :81, p D :564, demonstrated that this pattern did not differ across the two
religious groups, and an additional MANOVA showed that the recateogrization manipulation
did no interact with the preceeding religious fundamentalism manipulation, F.6; 109/ D 1:28,
p D :273.
Specifically, the between-subjects effects showed that, after recategorization into a dual
Abrahamic group, participants showed less resource distribution bias on the second resource
distribution tasks, M D 4:01, SE D :17, than those in the separate group condition, M D
4:58, SE D :16, F.1; 180/ D 6:11, p D :014, 2p D :03. Moreover, they also showed more
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positive feelings towards the Abrahamic outgroup, M D 64:61, SE D 2:73, than their peers
in the separate group condition, M D 51:88, SE D 2:63, F.1; 180/ D 11:26, p D :001,
2p D :06. Last, again demonstrating the limiting factor that dual Abrahamic categorization
only reduces bias toward Abrahamic outgroups, no other significant effects were observed for
feelings towards the remaining non-Abrahamic outgroups (.177 < ps < .607).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Two studies, applying different methodological approaches and using samples from different
cultures and cross-national and intranational contexts, showed that religious fundamentalism
leads Christian and Muslim believers alike to reject dual group categorization despite of obvious
common theological grounds. This is unfortunate, because dual Abrahamic categorization, in
turn and in accord with previous research on common and dual group categorizations (e.g.,
Dovidio et al., 2007; Dovidio, Saguy, & Shnabel, 2009; Kunst, Thomsen, & Sam, 2014),
consistently led to less bias toward the Abrahamic outgroup in terms of real monetary donations
to outgroup children desperately in need, resource distribution scenarios and intergroup feelings.
Yet, although dual Abrahamic categorization emerges here as a promising construct for
Christian–Muslim relations, two caveats have to be mentioned: First and as predicted, dual
Abrahamic categorization had no effect on group bias among Atheists for whom dual Abra-
hamic categorization should be irrelevant for their self-concepts and simply represents knowl-
edge about Abrahamic groups. Second, although dual categorization led to less group bias
among believers as predicted, it did so only when the outgroup was seen as part of the relevant
Abrahamic group. Hence, dual Abrahamic categorization seems to leave general religious
tolerance unaffected.
Although religious fundamentalism has been associated with conflicts between religious
groups in many parts of the world (Emerson & Hartman, 2006), little has been known about
the underlying psychological mechanisms of this relationship. The present article suggests that
one central reason for why religious fundamentalism is particularly destructive for interreligious
relations is that it literally divides religious groups, making believers think less in terms of
theological commonalities and more in terms of theological differences, reinforcing social
psychological divisions à la “us versus them.”
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